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DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
INCENTIVES OFFERED BY STATES: A TEST OF THE 
ARMS RACE HYPOTHESIS 
Mark A. Jenn and Farrokh Nourzad* 
Abstract-This paper tests the "arms race" hypothesis, which postulates that states tend to 
increase their incentive offerings 10 new firms if such incentive programs are in use in 
other states that are perceived to be direct competitors. Using a pooled 
time·serieslcross·section sample of twelve states covering the period from 1969 through 
1985 and a model that controls for the effects of various economic and political factors, 
we find strong support for the "arms race" hypothesis. This result is robust to the 
alternative specifications of the incentive offerings and different measures of the degree of 
competition among states. 
"Alabama declared war on North and South Carolina last spring. No 
blood was shed, but a lot of money was. . .. " 
(Browning and Cooper, 1993, p. AI) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The war referred to in Browning and Cooper's quote was a battle for the 
location of the new Mercedes Benz plant in the Unites States. The weapons of 
choice were economic development incentive packages. Alabama won this war, 
but at what cost? According to Browning and Cooper (1993), the tax abatement 
incentives alone reportedly will cost Alabama over $300 million. Infrastructure 
improvements, government-paid retraining and purchasing the plant's land for 
Mercedes were all part of the dea1. It is evident that the costs to Alabama will be 
enormous and only time will tell whether the benefits wi)] be large enough to 
cover these costs. 
A cost-benefit analysis of this and other incentive battles is a worthy pursuit, 
but before any such analysis can take place, one question must be answered. Do 
incentive offerings by states actually affect the locational decisions of firms? 
Cooper and Ruffenbach (1993) report that Mercedes executives claimed the in-
centive packages offered to them were not a major factor in their decision. 
Likewise, according to Bartik et al. (1987), Saturn officials claimed that the in-
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centives offered to them during their locational decision process in the mid-1980s 
mattered little. 
A sizable literature exists on this subject, but the findings are contradictory. 
They indicate that at best, the effect of such incentive packages is marginal, and at 
worst they are a waste of resources. Given the ambiguity concerning the useful-
ness of such incentive packages, the question arises as to why states continue to 
use these packages so heavily. Several factors have been identified as possible 
reasons: employment problems. political factors, and income problems, to name a 
few. One hypothesis that is prevalent throughout the literature, but that has been 
only casually investigated, is the "arms race" (1985) hypothesis. 1 Peretz (1986), 
Grady (1987). and Rubin and Zorn (1985) all alude to such a hypothesis. Peretz 
(1986. p. 625) identifies an "arms race" model as one where "states and localities 
are forced into matching and/or beating incentives provided by other states and 
localities." Only Grady (1987) has attempted to quantitatively examine this 
hypothesis and has found some evidence supporting it. 2 However, his analysis is 
overly simplistic because it is based on correlation coefficients that do not control 
for other influences. 
In this paper, we test the "arms race" hypothesis using a time-series/cross-
sectional sample of twelve states and a model that takes into account the effects of 
various economic and political factors. We find strong support for the "arms race" 
hypothesis. but we obtain mixed results concerning the effect of political and 
economic factors on state incentive offerings. These findings suggest that some 
mechanism. be it voluntary or governmental. must be found in order to reign in 
the excessive competition among states for industrial development. If this 
mechanism does not materialize. states will continue to increase incentive offer-
ings and thus increase the costs of economic development to levels where the net 
benefits of such development programs may be negative. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, the relevant 
literature is reviewed. In section Ill, an econometric model of incentive offerings 
by states is specified and the data used in this study are described. In section IV 
the results of the empirical analysis are presented and discussed. In the final sec-
tion, limitations of this analysis are identified and suggestions for further research 
are offered. 
II. PREVIOUS WORK 
The first question that needs to be addressed is whether or not incentive of-
ferings have any meaningful effect on the location of industries in states. Incen-
ti ve packages such as the one offered to Mercedes by Alabama are centered 
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around state and local tax breaks and infrastructure improvements. The literature 
concerning the effect of state and local taxes on locational decisions yields con-
tradictory results. Grady (1987), Rubin and Zorn (1985), and Litvak and Daniels 
(1983) all conclude that state and local tax levels matter little to firms making 
locational choices because those taxes constitute a negligible portion of overall 
business costs. Recently, however. Bartik (1985) and Walker and Greenstreet 
(1991) have shown that lower tax levels increase the probability of sites being 
chosen for plant location. 
Bartik (1991). who provides an extensi ve review of the literature since 1979. 
finds that inter-area studies encompassing decisions among states report a small 
and negative effect on various measures of business activity due to taxes. The 
median elasticity of business growth with respect to taxes found in these studies is 
-0.15; an increase in taxes of 10 percent would decrease long-run business activity 
by 1.5 percent. Although the effect of tax level differentials increases as the size 
of area under investigation decreases. state economic development battles occur at 
the inter-area level. These findings suggest that state and local taxes may have an 
effect on business growth, albeit a small one. 
As far as the effect of infrastructure improvements is concerned, the litera-
ture is just as contradictory. Bartik (1991) analyzed studies concentrating on the 
effect of state and local public service spending on business growth. including in-
frastructure expenditures. He reports that 60 percent of such studies find at least 
one positive and statistically significant estimate associated with the public spend-
ing variable. A major problem arose because only three of the fifty studies sur-
veyed properly controlled for the increased taxation necessary to carry out 
increased spending on public goods. It foHows that in the cases of both state and 
local taxes and public goods spending, their effects on business growth may be 
ambiguous. 
These surveys, though, address only general state and local policies, and not 
specific targeted incentive offerings. This is also true of studies such as those by 
Ladd et al. (1993) and Case (1992) concerning test variants of the "arms race" 
hypothesis in tenns of fiscal copycatting by neighboring states or counties. To 
identify whether or not specific incentive packages have positive effects, case 
study and survey methods have been used. As noted earlier, after GM's Saturn 
subsidiary chose to locate its manufacturing plant in Tennessee, executives 
claimed that the individual state's incentive offers were not the determining factor 
in their location decision. Bartik et al. (1987) analyze Saturn' s decision in more 
depth. By calculating the costs per vehicle at each of the finalist sites based on 
labor costs, transport costs and tax levels, they found that the lowest cost location 
was the one chosen in Tennessee. In this analysis the incentive packages were in-
tentional1y omitted. and even with their omission the authors came to the same 
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locational decision as did Saturn. Even though several states, such as Minnesota 
and New York, offered substantial subsidies, with Minnesota's reportedly in the 
area of $1.2 billion, the decision of Saturn was not swayed. 
Walker and Greenstreet (1991) use a survey approach to analyze this issue. 
By contacting the industrial planners of firms located in the Appalachian region, 
the authors identified those industries that had searched for a site location among 
alternative localities or different states. Of these searchers, in only 15 percent of 
the cases did the incentive offers prove decisive in location decision. When one 
takes into account that local searchers, those choosing between sites within a 
municipality, were also included in the survey, one comes to the conclusion that 
the number of regional searchers affected by incentives are in fact very small. As 
was seen in Bartik's (1991) analysis, local searchers are more influenced by such 
incentives than regional searchers. 
The existing literature does little to clear the fog surrounding the usefulness 
of state incentive offerings. Nevertheless, state economic development agencies 
continue to widely use incentive offerings to attract firms. A question that arises 
concerns the reason why states continue to offer incentives, given the ambiguity 
surrounding their effectiveness. The reasons can be grouped into three general 
categories: economic, political and competitive. First, states may be attempting to 
alleviate economic shortcomings. Grady (1987) uses two measures of economic 
influence on development policy, unemployment and manufacturing employment. 
It is hypothesized that states with high levels of unemployment will attempt to en-
tice firms to locate in their region in order to create new jobs and increase 
employment. Also, as Grady notes, most incentive packages are offered to 
manufacturing finns. Thus, the level of manufacturing employment in a state can 
affect the amount of incentives offered by that state. A third economic influence is 
the level of state income. In certain states unemployment may not be a severe 
problem, but the population's level of income may be. If a large number of jobs in 
a state are low-skill. low-wage jobs. the state may attempt to lure higher-paying 
industries with incentive packages. 
The second category of influences on incentive offerings are political factors. 
Grady (1987) identifies interest group strength as one potential factor in develop- { 
ment policy choices. States with strong business interest groups should be more 
inclined to offer incentives to businesses due to pressure by these groups. Another 
political factor is the pressure placed on elected officials. Therefore, it may also I 
be the case that incentive offering levels are affected by whether or not an election 
is being held presently or in near future. 
The third general category consists of competitive factors. Here is where the n 
"arms race" hypothesis lies. The key to this hypothesis is the uncertainty concern-
ing the effectiveness of incentive offerings. and the risk aversion of policy-makers 
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who fear the possible adverse consequences associated with not offering develop-
le ment incentives. The "arms race" hypothesis is an outgrowth of Walker's (1969) 
policy diffusion theory. which postulates that states are more likely to enact new 
e. programs if such programs are in use in states that are percei ved to be direct com-
rl. petitors. This competition then escalates. since states are unable to coordinate 
Ig policy. in this case over the distribution of employment across states (Rubin and 
)f Zorn, 1985). Competition forces states to increase incentive offers to "neutralize 
Ie offers by other states" (Peretz. 1986. p. 630). Incentive offerings then tum into 
a "arms races" among states as each must combat packages available elsewhere by 
it developing their own incentives for offers to new firms . 
. s Only Grady (1987) has attempted to evaluate each category of influence 
h quantitatively. His analysis. however, though is simplistic to a fault. In the case of 
economic factors, he calculates correlation coefficients between changes in 
;s weighted incentive scores and changes in manufacturing employment and relative 
s unemployment. These coefficients do not control for influences of other factors 
s occurring at the same time which may wash out the separate effects of unemploy-
y ment and manufacturing employment changes. 
II In the case of interest group strength, Grady calculates correlation coeffi-
:) cients between changes in incentive scores and Morehouse's (1981) categoriza-
:; tion of state interest group strength. Once again, he ignores other factors that 
might have a bearing on the development decision. Similarly. when Grady 
anaJyzes the "arms race" hypothesis, he uses a simple rank-order correlation. By 
~ identifying regional groupings. he calculates the rank-orders of the states within 
) those groups according to their weighted incentive offerings and examines 
1 whether these rankings are stable over time. Grady finds that in most regions, the 
s rankings changed much over time. He then concludes that since the rankings at 
! the beginning of the period are quite different from those at the end of the sample 
period. the changes can be attributed to an incentive "arms race". Again. the major 
shortcoming in this analysis is the failure to observe the entire context of the 
policy-making process. Only after this is done can more concrete results be ob-
tained. In the next section we specify a model that controls for important aspects 
of the decision-making environment. 
III. MODEL, DATA, AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
Based on the above discussion of the three categories of influences, we for-
mulate the following multiple regression model, 
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OFFERit = ~O + ~lCOMPjt + J32URit + ~3EMPit + ~41NCit + J35ELECTit 
+ J36LOBBYit +£it (1) 
where OFFER is a measure of incentives offered by state i in period t; COMP 
denotes the degree of competition between state i and states j * i for testing the 
"arms race" hypothesis; UR is the ith state unemployment rate; EMP represents 
manufacturing employment in each state; INC is a measure of income; ELECT 
and LOBBY represent political influences; and it is an error term. 
Using pooled time-series and cross-sectional data, we estimate four versions 
of Equation (I) that differ with respect to the specification of the dependent vari-
able. OFFER. and the "arms race" variable. COMPo In the first model, the de-
pendent variable. denoted OFFER I, is the weighted sum of 17 incentives that 
each state has authorization to offer in each year of the sample period. The peri-
odical Industrial Development and Site Location surveys state economic develop-
ment agencies yearly and reports the incentives offered by each state.3 Although 
this is an extensive review of the incentive offerings in each state, Grady (1987) 
accurately points out that it does not distinguish between policies of differing 
levels of importance. In order to overcome this problem. we follow Grady and use 
a survey of industrial facility planners conducted by the Industrial Development 
Research Council in 1977. Planners selected the top 10 locational incentives out 
of the 57 listed in Industrial Development. Scores were then calculated for each 
incentive based on the number of planners who ranked them as important. Of the 
top 20 selected. 17 are used in the present study due to data availability.4 These 
incentives and their scores are presented in the appendix. For each state we con-
structed a score based on which of these 17 incentives it offered in a given year. 
In our first model. the independent variable representing the degree of com-
petition among the states, denoted COMPI, is specified as the weighted sum of 
the 17 development incentives in state i minus the average of the weighted sum of 
the same 17 incentives offered by all other states j *- i. If the "arms race" 
hypothesis is to be supported by the data, the estimated coefficient on COMPI 
should be negative and statistically significant; if a state has a score which is 
decreasing in relation to its place among its competitors. COMPI will decrease. 
If the detennination of incentive offerings is based on the competition among 
states, a negative value of COMPI should result in a positive change in incentive 
score as states attempt to catch up to their competitors. 
In our second version of Equation (1). the dependent variable, OFFER2, is 
the simple sum of the 17 incentives mentioned above. This means that all incen-
tives are assigned a weight of one, regardless of their relative importance to 
economic development. We also specify our measure of the degree of competition 
among the states. which we designate as COMP2. as the simple sum of the 17 
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development incentives offered by state i in year t minus the average of the un-
weighted sum of the incentives offered by states j -::t:- i in that year. The motivation 
behind this specification of Equation (1) is to examine the sensitivity of the results 
to the particular weighting scheme used to construct OFFER 1.5 Once again, a 
negative and statistically significant estimate for the coefficient of this variable 
would support the "arms race" hypothesis. 
In each of the first two version of Equation (]), the regressor representing the 
"arms race" hypothesis (COMP] and COMP2) equals the corresponding depend-
ent variable (OFFER 1 and OFFER2) less the average number of incentives of-
fered by other states. Thus the incentive offering by each state appears on both 
sides of the regression equation. This can be troublesome as the resulting regres-
sor can be correlated with the random error term, E, rendering the estimates biased 
and inconsistent. While this is testable, we will estimate a version of Equation (]) 
in which the dependent variable is OFFER1 described earlier but the "arms race" 
independent variable is simply the average of the weighted sum of incentives of-
fered by other states, which we denote COMP3. Note that, unlike COMPI and 
COMP2, a positive and statistically significant estimate for the coefficient of 
COMP3 would be consistent with the "arms race" hypothesis; more incentive of-
ferings by other states would prompt state i to increase its offerings. 
Finally, in order to examine the "arms race" hypothesis in terms of a specific 
type of development incentive. our fourth version of Equation (1) uses as the de-
pendent variable, OFFER4, the weighted scores of nine tax incentives authorized 
by each of the twelve states in our sample in each year of the sample period.6 In 
this case. for the "arms race" independent variable we use the one-year lagged 
value of the average of the weighted sum of tax incentives offered by the other 
states. COMP4. 7 As in the case of COMP3. the "arms race" hypothesis is sup-
ported if the estimated coefficient associated with COMP4 is positive and statisti-
cally significantly different from zero. 
The other explanatory variables in Equation (l) are common to all four ver-
sions of this equation. The UR variable is the state unemployment rate taken from 
the Statistical Abstract of the United States. The sign of the coefficient on UR 
should be positive. As states encounter unemployment problems. they are com-
pelled to increase incentive offerings to bring in new jobs. 
EMP is the level of manufacturing employment in each state and is taken 
from the REIS Data Tape (1991). The sign of the coefficient on EMP is expected 
to be negative; a decrease in manufacturing employment is expected to cause an 
increase in development incentive offerings. 
INC is rea] personal income by state. again taken from the REfS Data Tape. 
This variable is also expected to have a negative coefficient. This would indicate 
increases in incentive offerings due to income generation problems in a state. 
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ELECT, which represents the political influences on policy decisions, is a 
dummy variable that equals one in the years in which states elect a governor. 
Governor's elections were chosen over legislative elections due to the increased 
level of coverage and participation that accompanies gubernatorial elections as 
opposed to legislative elections that many times pass nearly unnoticed. The sign 
of the coefficient associated with this variable is expected to be positive as at-
tempts to attract businesses are intensified in election years in order to gain votes. 
For LOBB Y, which represents the strength of interest groups within a state, 
we use the measure suggested by Morehouse (1981) to define a dummy variable. 
She has developed a categorization of interest group strength by state based on 
surveys of elected officials and lobbyists and levels of funding and membership. 
Although Morehouse defines three categories of strength, Strong, Moderate and 
Weak, all of the states in our sample fall into the Strong or Moderate categories. 
Therefore, one dummy variable is used to distinguish between these two 
categories. In constructing this variable, we choose the strong category as the base 
so that this variable is expected to have a negative coefficient; states with 
moderate business interest groups pressure officials less heavily into subsidizing 
business, while states with strong interest groups will be pressured more. 
Our sample covers the years 1969 through 1985. The choice of the period 
was dictated by data availability especially concerning manufacturing employ-
ment and income. As far as the choice of states is concerned, Grady (1987), Rubin 
and Zorn (1986), Walker and Greenstreet (1991) and Waselenko (1981) note that 
firms' location decisions normally take place on an inter-regional basis in that 
they first choose a specific region that fits their needs and then choose between 
locations in that region. With this in mind, along with recently highly contested 
locational battles, we include twelve Southern and Border states in our sample.8 , 
With 15 years and 12 states, we have 180 observations. 
IV. FINDINGS 
, 
I 
Before estimating our empirical model, we subjected all non-binary variables I: 
to two transformations. First, in order to compress their variance and thus reduce I 
the likelihood of heleroscedasticity and non stationarity in variance, we expressed I 
all variables but two in the logarithmic form. The two regressors CaMPI and f 
COMP2 contain some negative values and therefore their logarithm could not be ! 
taken. Second, in order to insure non-spurious results, all of the non-binary vari- I 
I 
abies are first-differenced so as to remove the unit root that may be present in the t 
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The first step in the estimation process is to determine whether a fixed-effect 
(covariance) or a random-effect (error-components) model is the proper specifica-
tion using Hausman's (1978) test. For none of the four versions of Equation (I) 
was the Hausman test statistic, which follows the X2 distribution with 5 degrees of 
freedom, significant at reasonable levels. This suggests that all four models 
should be estimated as a random-effect specification. Diagnostic tests indicated 
that every one of the models suffered from heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
To correct for these problems, we estimated the four versions of Equation (1) 
using two-step Generalized Least Squares (GLS). The estimation results are 
reported in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
Estimates of State Development Incentive Offerings (p-values in parentheses) 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
~lnOFFERlita ~lnOFFER2it b ~lnOFFER3itC ~lnOFFER4itd 
ACOMPI/ -0.0005 
(0.0001) 
ACOMP2/ -0.0329 
(0.0001) 
&nCOMP3jtg 0.4365 
(0.0001) 
AlnCOMP4jt-1 h 1.9835 
(0.0001) 
AlnlNCit -1.3024 -0.7503 -0.4173 1.5893 
(0.0063) (0.2086) (0.2140) (0.1180) 
AI nEMPit 0.0679 0.0152 0.0352 -2.4136 
(0.7967) (0.9575) (0.8606) (0.0001 ) 
AlnURit -0.0724 -0.1318 -0.0423 -0.5487 
(0.0636) (0.0008) (0.1705) (0.0001) 
ELECTit 0.0167 0.0011 0.0041 -0.1156 
(0.1049) (0.9274) (0.6636) (0.0001) 
LOBBYi, -0.0383 -0.0553 -0.0154 -0.1168 
(0.0665) (0.0034) (0.2529) (0.0001) 
INTERCEPT 0.1587 0.1235 0.0588 -0.1229 
(0.0007) (0.0416) (0.0698) (0.2134) 
-ofFERJi' ::: weighted sum of 17 development incentives offered by state i in year t 
bOFFER2i' simple sum of 17 development incentives offered by state i in year t 
cOfFER3;1 ::: same as OFFER lit 
dOFFER4;, ::: weighted sum of 9 types of tax incenti ves offered by state i in year t 
CCOMPljt ::: weighted sum of 17 development incentives offered by state i in year t minus average of the 
same 17 weighted incentives offered by states j ~ i in year t 
fCOMP2jl ::: difference between simple sum of 17 development incentives offered by state i in year t 
and unweighted average of those offered by states j ~ i 
'COMP3j' ::: weighted sum of 17 development incentives offered by states j ~ i in year t 
"coMP4j,.1 weighted sum of 9 types of tax incentives offered by states j ~ i in the previous year 
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Consider first the estimated coefficients on the variable representing the 
"arms race" hypothesis, AlnCOMPl, AlnCOMP2, AlnCOMP3, and AlnCOMP4 in 
models 1 through 4, respectively. According to the results in Table 1, in models I 
and 2 the estimated coefficient on this variable are negative and highly significant, 
a result that supports the "anns race" hypothesis. IO In models 3 and 4 the es-
timated coefficients associated with this variable are positive and statistically sig-
nificant. These results are also in support of the "arms race" hypothesis. I I These 
findings concerning the "arms race" hypothesis are robust to the specification of 
the dependent variable and the independent variable representing the degree of 
competition among states. It is important to note that the conclusion regarding the 
"arms race" hypothesis is reached while control is made for other economic and 
political influences. 
Now consider the economic factors. The estimated coefficient on the log-dif-
ference of INC has the expected negative sign in models 1-3 but is statistically 
significant only in model 1. In model 4 the estimated coefficient on income is 
positive but is not statistically significant at conventional levels. As far as the 
employment variable is concerned, its estimated coefficient is positive but is not 
statistically significantly different from zero in models 1-3. In model 4, on the 
other hand, this estimate has a negative sign and is highly significant, a result that 
is consistent with the notion that states use incentive packages as a countercyclical; 
measure. The estimated coefficient on unemployment rate is negative in all four 
models and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better in models 
1,2, and 4. Note, however, that the negative sign of this estimate is not consistent. 
with our a priori expectation. The unexpected signs of the estimated coefficients 
on the employment and unemployment rate variables are likely to be due to the 
high correlation between these variables. Indeed, the correlation coefficient be-
tween InUR and InEMP is -0.70, which is statistically significant (t = 13.08). : 
Moreover, the correlation coefficient between AlnUR versus AlnEMP and AlnINC ! 
taken together equals 0.74 which is also statistically significant (F :;:; 103.08). In ! 
spite of this, in all four models the estimated parameters associated with the three i 
variables representing economic influences are jointly significant. J 
Turning to the political factors, we observe that the estimated coefficient on I 
ELECT is positive but is not statistically significant in models 1-3, whereas in t 
model 4 this estimate is negative and statistically significant at high levels of con- I 
fidence. 12 The estimated coefficient on the special interest groups, LOBBY, has I 
the expected negative sign and is statistically significant in all models but the t 
third. In all four versions of Equation (l), the estimated coefficients associated I 
with the two variables that control for political influences are jointly significant at j 
high levels of confidence. These results point to the strength of non-economic fac- t 
tors in the determination of the level of business incentives offered by states. r 
; 
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e Although our sample consists of twelve southern and border states, many of 
n the major incentive battles over the past 10 years have involved a handful of 
states. In both the cases of OM's Saturn plant decision and the Mercedes Benz 
plant decision five states, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
'and Alabama, were either finalists or offered large packages. With this in mind, 
we re-estimated model I while restricting the sample to these five states. This 
regression was run without the LOBBY variable because all five states are ranked 
, . as strong in terms of interest group strength. The estimation results are reported 
below with p-values in parentheses, 
~nOFFERit = - 0.1588 - 0.OOO9COMPjl + 0.8177~lnEMPit + O.3467~lnURit 
(0.0712)(0.0001) (0.0377) (0.0011) 
+ 1.5490~lnINCit + 0.1 222ELECTit (2) 
(0.1021) (0.0001) 
According to these results, all estimates are statistically significant at the 
10 percent level or better. As in the case of the full-sample version of modell, the 
estimated coefficients on the "arms race" and the election year variables also have 
the expected signs. As for the economic variables, unlike the results from the full 
sample, the unemployment variable has a parameter estimate that is of the ex-
pected positive sign and is statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on 
the other two economic variables, INC and EMP, while significant, have unex-
pected signs. In both cases this may be a result of reverse causation; higher incen-
tive offerings can lead to higher levels of manufacturing employment and real 
personal income in these states. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The analysis presented in this paper can be improved in a number of ways. 
First, the economic factors can be extended to include other variables such as the 
number of firms a state attracts over the course of a year. Among other things, 
such a variable would account for increases in incentive offers due to success of 
previous incentive offerings. This in tum may allow the other economic variables 
to exhibit their true effects more clearly. 
Second. more can be done to capture the effect of political factors. Since 
development policy takes place in a political atmosphere. these influences need to 
be better elaborated. A dummy variable representing interest group strength may 
not be enough. A more comprehensive measure needs to be used in order to better 
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differentiate group strength among states. Also. a variable taking into account the 
composition of state legislatures, whether Democrat or Republican dominated, 
may offer insight. 
Third, the dependent variable in each of the four models we estimated may 
be a less than optimal measure of the increasing use of incentives. By the end of 
the sample period considered in the present study, most states had made quite 
similar packages available to firms. Recently. the size of such packages has been 
under question so that a monetary measure of the magnitude of the offerings to 
firms may constitute a better indicator of incentive levels. 
Final1y, as can be seen from the restricted-sample regression results, there 
needs to be a better identification of regional competitors. This regression shows 
that in the Southern region there exists a subset of states that have competed even 
more strongly than other states in that region. The causes of this competitive edge 
need to be better investigated to identify whether these states are compelled to 
compete for different reasons than other southern states. Only after this question 
is answered can better modelling take place. 
We found evidence suggesting that an incentive "arms race" may in fact be 
taking place. If this is true, the escalating level of incentives may be eroding the 
marginal benefits associated with offering such incentives. Some (e.g., Rubin and 
Zorn. 1985) have proposed some sort of control over the escalation of incentives 
for just such a reason. As states compete amongst themselves. the costs of • 
economic development continue to grow. while the benefits remain essentially the 
same, and thus the net benefits continue to decrease. In any event, more research 
is necessary on all aspects of economic development policy. costlbenefit analysis, 
the effectiveness of incentives. and the motivations behind incentive offerings. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Other terms used in similar contexts are fiscal "copycatting," "spillovers," ~ 
I· 
and "mimicking". f 
2. Variants of the "arms race" hypothesis have been tested in a more general f 
contex t by Case et al. (I 993) and Ladd (1 992) among others. I 
3. This periodical was previously named Industrial Development and In- I 
dustrial Development and Manufacture's Record. ! 
4. The omitted incentives and their scores are industrial bond financing! 
(191); wage incentive programs (44); and state programs promoting R&D (20). I.· •... · 
5. This was suggested by an anonymous referee of the Review. 
f 6. These are items I, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, II, and 15 in the appendix. ! 
! 
~ 
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7. These last two versions of Equation (1) and the rationale for their use 
were suggested by another anonymous referee of the Review. 
8. With a few exceptions, these states are the same as those used by Grady 
.(1987) in his Southern Region comprised of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Geor-
gia. Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee. Texas, 
and Virginia. The present study omits Arkansas due to data availability and 
Texas, due to its low level of incentive activity. We add Kentucky, Indiana and 
o Ohio, due to their strong involvement in location competition. 
9. Due to the small number of time periods, no formal test of stationarity 
'e such as the Dickey-Fuller unit root test was conducted. Instead, a visual inspec-
s tion of the data plotted over time was performed that led us to believe that most 
11 variables are non-stationary. 
e 10. In modell, we tested ACOMPI for endogeneity using Hausman's test. 
:> The test statistic. which has an asymptotic t-distribution, equaled -0.223 with a p-
11 value of 0.82. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that in model 1 
ACOMPI is exogenous. 
! 11. Recall that because of the way COMP3 and COMP4 are specified, a 
! positive sign on their coefficients would be consistent with the "arms race" 
hypothesis. 
f 
12. Note that in model I this estimate is significant at the 10.5% level. 
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